Toward Faithful Explanatory Active Learning with Self-explainable Neural Nets

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How can you trust a black-box ML model?



Black-box models can be whimsical and hard to control

How can you trust a human?



But other humans are black boxes too!

We have built-in facilities for determining trust into other agents (*theory of mind*). They rely on:

Understanding: trust involves understanding the other's beliefs & intentions; it depends on the perceived **competence**, **understandability**, **directability** [HJBU13]

 \rightarrow This is the goal of $\ensuremath{\textbf{explainable}}$ machine learning

Interaction: trust is updated **dynamically**; interactions let you build **expectations** [CDvW⁺10]

 \rightarrow This is the goal of interactive machine learning

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However it is often **opaque**...

Active Learning is Opaque



The user **a**) does not know the **model's beliefs**, **b**) cannot **affect** them directly, **c**) has no clue of what his **feedback does**!

Local Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) [RSG16]

Given a black-box classifier $f : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$ and interpretable features ϕ_1, \ldots, ϕ_m , LIME explains a prediction $y_0 = f(x_0)$ by **approximating** f around x_0 with an interpretable classifier g_{x_0} :



Example: fitting a linear approximation

$$g_{x_0}(x) \approx \operatorname{sigmoid}(\sum_{j=1}^m w_j \phi_j(x_0) + b)$$

 w_j quantifies the **responsibility** of the *j*th feature ϕ_j

Husky or wolf?



Consider an example image classification task about discriminating between **husky dogs** and **wolves**

Husky or wolf? ... and why?

Let ϕ_1, \ldots, ϕ_m refer to individual pixels

Local explanations allow to spot cases where the model is **right for the wrong reasons**



Remark: this does not suggest any way to fix the issue, though!

Explainable Active Learning

CAIPI(rinhas) turn LIME into trust



a) Explain predictions to user (competence, understandability),b) Allow user to correct explanations (directability)

- 1 The user's correction indicates the false positive segments
- 2 CAIPI converts the correction into **counterexamples**, e.g., by filling in random values while keeping the same label

Example: husky predicted right for the wrong reasons



Faithful Explainable Active Learning

LIME can be unfaithful

Explaining $y^0 = f(\mathbf{x}^0)$ with ϕ_1, \ldots, ϕ_m is **non-trivial**:

- Compute interpretable representation ${m \xi}^0=\phi(x^0)$
- Sample $\boldsymbol{\xi}^1,\ldots,\boldsymbol{\xi}^s$ by perturbing $\boldsymbol{\xi}^0$ at random

- For each
$$i = 1, \ldots, s$$
:

- Project
$$x^i = \phi^{-1}(\xi^i)$$

– Label
$$y^i = f(x^i)$$

- Weight ξⁱ with a kernel k that represents the neighborhood of ξ⁰
- Fit local model g^0 on $\{(\xi^i, y^i)\}$ via cost-sensitive learning
- **Extract** an explanation from g^0

Many of these steps can introduce large amounts of noise

LIME can be unfaithful



Example: the circle is the **kernel** k, only points inside of it have substantial weight.

 \rightarrow the samples fail to capture f regardless of how many

Unfaithful explanations can confuse (and potentially also persuade) the user. They are contrary to the spirit and goal of explainable interactive learning!

(Unfaithfulness is an issue for other local explainers!)

Self-explainable Neural Networks (SENNs)

Linear models are often considered interpretable:

$$f(x) = \text{sigmoid}(\sum_{j=1}^{m} w_j \phi(x)_j + b)$$

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SENNs extend linear models to be also deep:

$$f(x) = \operatorname{sigmoid}(\sum_{j=1}^{m} w(x)_j \phi(x)_j + b(x))$$

The "explanation" w(x) varies with x—but its regularized to vary *slowly* w.r.t. $\phi(x)$.

Given a dataset with instances x, labels y, model explanations z and their corrections \bar{z} , Calimocho learns SENNs using:

$$\begin{split} \min_{f} \lambda \ell_{Y}(f) + (1 - \lambda) \ell_{Z}(f) + \alpha \Omega(f) \\ \ell_{Y}(f) &= \sum \ell_{Y}(f(x), y) & \text{ \# label loss} \\ \ell_{Z}(f) &= \sum \langle w(x), z - \bar{z} \rangle & \text{ \# explanation loss} \end{split}$$

Take-away message:

- LIME is approximate and slow, while SENNs are exact and fast
- CAIPI converts corrections into counterexamples, while

Calimocho learns w(x) directly from explanation corrections

Experiment: Colors

 5×5 images can be positive for two reasons:

Rule 0: four corner pixels have the same colors

Rule 1: three top middle pixels have different colors



In training set either **both** rules hold or **none** does; in the test set only one of them applies [RHDV17]

Q1: Does CALI learn from corrections?



Label loss (left) and **explanation loss** (right) on the test set as more queries are asked (x axis)

Take-away: when no corrections are given (gray line), label loss decreases slowly and explanation loss **increases**!

Q2: Can CALI learn deeper SENNs?



Label loss (left) and **explanation loss** (right) on the test set as more queries are asked (x axis)

Take-away: explanation corrections can help enormously to learn deeper nets with L layers!

Take-away message

.) Trust \approx Interaction + Explanations

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- Explainable active learning with Calimocho:
- Explain predictions over time \rightarrow mental model
- Acquire explanation corrections \rightarrow directability
- Use self-explainable model \rightarrow faithfulness
- 3 Preliminary experiments show promise:
 - Corrections keep explanations under control
 - Might be key in applying AL to deeper nets



Much more work needed!

Thank you! Questions?



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